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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 2012, the Swedish economy is expected to slow down as compared to 2011, with a 
foreseen GDP growth of 0.3 %. After positive labour market developments in 2011, 
unemployment is expected to rise slightly to 7.7% in 2012. 
The performance of the Swedish economy is overall very good. Since the mid-1990s, Sweden 
has followed an ambitious agenda of fiscal and structural reform. Most recently, the reform 
efforts have focused on achieving full employment, ensuring a strong and stable financial 
sector, improving the functioning of the housing market, reforming the education system, 
promoting innovative and dynamic businesses and tackling the environmental and climate 
change issues.  
However, several challenges still need to be tackled. Notwithstanding government measures 
in the area of the labour market integration of vulnerable groups, the unemployment rates of 
these groups remain high. While the housing market has cooled somewhat since mid-2011, 
several structural distortions persist that have contributed to house-price volatility in the past. 
Certain aspects of the Swedish tax system could be made more effective, efficient and 
growth-enhancing. Moreover, Sweden's competitive position is threatened in the medium 
term by falling business investment in R&D and inadequate commercialisation of innovative 
output. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Procedural aspects 
In June 2011, the Commission proposed three country specific recommendations1 (CSRs) for 
economic and structural reform policies for Sweden. In July 2011 the Council of the European 
Union adopted these recommendations which concerned public finances, housing and the 
labour market. 
In November 2011, the Commission published its Annual Growth Survey for 2012 (AGS 
2012) in which it set out its proposals for building the necessary common understanding about 
the priorities for action at national and EU levels in 2012. It focused on five priorities — 
growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, restoring normal lending to the economy, promoting 
growth and competitiveness, tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the 
crisis, and modernising public administration — and encouraged Member States to implement 
them in the 2012 European Semester. 
Against this background, Sweden presented its national reform programme (NRP) and 
convergence programme (CP) on 20 April 2012. These programmes give details on progress 
made since July 2011 and plans going forward. The two documents outline in an integrated 
manner the fiscal consolidation efforts on the one hand and key structural reforms and 
reforms underpinning macroeconomic stabilisation on the other. The CP is in conformity with 
the Code of Conduct and the NRP follows the guidance provided by the Commission. Sweden 
has ensured close coherence between the two programming documents. Sweden is invited to 
set in its next NRP a numerical target for reducing social exclusion to supplement the EU 
target of reducing the number of persons at risk of poverty/social exclusion by 20 million. 
Before adopting the NRP and the CP, the Government conducted extensive consultations, 
particularly at the local and regional level. Responding to requests from interested civil- 
society groups, such organisations were consulted at an early stage of the NRP process. 
Consultations also took place in the framework of a special reference group composed of 
Government ministries and social partners, including both trade unions and employers' 
associations. These efforts have clearly contributed to enhancing ownership and 
understanding of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
This Staff Working Document assesses the state of implementation of the 2011 
recommendations as well as the AGS 2012 in Sweden, identifies current policy challenges 
and, on that basis, examines the country’s latest policy plans. 
Overall assessment 
Sweden has only partially implemented each of the Council recommendations. The fiscal 
policy stance is regarded as prudent, and is likely to ensure that Sweden fulfils its medium-
term objective (MTO) as from 2012. However, this is mainly due to the fact that the 
government has lowered the MTO from +1% of GDP to -1% of GDP as of 2012. In 2011, the 
more ambitious MTO was not fulfilled. In the area of the housing market and household 
indebtedness, the measures taken by the government are relevant, but focus mainly on 
strengthening the resilience of the financial sector. So far there has been less attention paid to 
measures to foster prudent lending or to diminish the debt bias in the financing of housing 
investment. Despite some promising first steps, the stringent rent regulation and constraints in 
the housing supply remain in place. As regards the labour market, the government has taken a 
large number of measures aimed at fostering the labour market participation of young people 
and other vulnerable groups, but it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of these 
                                                 
1  SEC(2011) 806 final of 7 June 2011 
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measures. Measures to increase flexibility at the lower end of the wage scale and to ease the 
difference in employment protection legislation for temporary and permanent workers are at 
the stage of a political debate. 
Although Sweden’s economic performance is very good, reflecting its ambitious fiscal 
consolidation and structural reform agenda since the mid-1990s, several challenges still need 
to be tackled, namely in the labour market, the housing market and the tax system. 
Notwithstanding government measures in the area of the labour market integration of 
vulnerable groups, these groups have not fully benefited from the observed cyclical 
improvement in the employment situation. While the housing market has cooled somewhat 
since mid-2011, several structural distortions persist that have contributed to house-price 
volatility in the past. In line with the analysis set out in the Commission’s AGS 2012, certain 
aspects of the Swedish tax system could be made more effective, efficient and growth-
enhancing. In particular, the current design of the taxation of both housing and VAT leaves 
room for improvement; improving the former could also help to address the challenges 
associated with housing-related indebtedness. 
The policy plans submitted by Sweden are relevant and credible, but in some areas lack the 
ambition to address these challenges comprehensively. The strategy to contain the risks of 
high household debt by strengthening the resilience of the financial sector could be 
accompanied by measures to foster prudent lending and flexibility of housing supply. Policy 
plans in the field of labour taxation are conditional on the available fiscal space and overlook 
the possibility of budget-neutral tax shifts linked, for example, to reviews of tax benefits for 
debt accumulation and the VAT structure. Finally, according to the NRP the Government 
intends to continue with active labour market policy measures as the main approach to 
ensuring the participation of vulnerable groups in the labour market, whereas a more 
determined policy response in other areas, such as employment protection legislation or wage 
formation, would also be warranted. 
 
2. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
2.1. Recent economic developments and outlook 
Recent economic developments 
After growth of 6.1 % in 2010 the Swedish economy continued its rapid recovery in 2011, 
reaching annual growth of 3.9 %. Most sectors of the economy contributed to this 
performance, with household consumption and investment particularly strong in the first half 
of the year and net exports booming in the third quarter. Positive labour market developments 
in the wake of the strong recovery in 2010 continued in 2011, with the seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate falling from 9 % in spring 2010 to 7.3 % in September 2011. In the second 
half of 2011, however, the fallout from the sovereign debt crisis sapped consumer and 
corporate confidence and the worsening international economic outlook affected Swedish 
exports, which plummeted in the fourth quarter. Households increased their saving rate as 
they saw their wealth affected by a fall in stock prices and declining house prices. 
For early 2012, various indicators send mixed signals. On the one hand, both business and 
consumer confidence have rebounded noticeably in the first months of the year and household 
expectations about future house price developments have also recovered strongly, helped by 
interest-rate cuts by the Riksbank.. On the other hand, the latest industrial production data and 
new orders have been disappointing, showing a sizeable contraction in February and March.  
 6 
The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate increased temporarily around the turn of the year 
but dropped again to 7.3 % in March 2012. 
Inflation has been low and has declined over the past year with HICP (harmonised index of 
consumer prices) inflation averaging at 1.4 %. The impact of high commodity prices has been 
mitigated by the lagged effects of currency appreciation, which continued until spring 2011. 
At the same time, low core inflation (HICP excluding energy and unprocessed food) reflected 
subdued unit labour costs, stemming from reasonable productivity growth and modest wage 
increases. 
Public finances are strong, with the general government budget ending the year with a slight 
surplus of 0.3 % in 2010 and 2011 and gross government debt falling to 38 % in 2011. In view 
of increasing uncertainty and the intention to achieve fiscal targets with a margin, the 
government adopted a rather cautious fiscal approach, abandoning most of its expansionary 
plans for the 2012 budget. Against a backdrop of strong fiscal fundamentals, Swedish 
government bonds are increasingly being considered as a safe haven investment, with the 
effect of strengthening the Swedish krona towards the end of 2011. 
Economic outlook 
The Commission’s interim forecast predicts that growth will remain subdued in early 2012, 
before gradually picking up. GDP growth is expected to reach 0.3 % in 2012 and 2.1 % in 
2013. In the short term, the outlook for export growth is rather subdued, as a number of 
trading partners are weighed down by the fallout from the sovereign-debt crisis in the euro 
area. Private consumption should also grow less briskly, with household spending expected to 
be held back by bleaker employment prospects and greater perceived uncertainty, including 
with respect to house prices. Some relief is expected from a more accommodative monetary 
policy stance and stronger real wage developments, whereas fiscal policy is not expected to 
do much to boost demand in the short term. 
Sweden’s convergence programme contains one main macroeconomic scenario, which is also 
the main scenario of the NRP. It foresees that real GDP growth will slow down from 4.1 % in 
2011 to 1.3 % in 2012, before accelerating again to average 3.7 % annually over the 2013-15 
period. The macroeconomic scenario is plausible for the 2011-12 period, when a broad-based 
deceleration is expected, whereas it looks favourable for the later years, when the strong 
acceleration in growth is based on households significantly lowering their saving rate. The 
government estimates that the major structural reform implemented in 2012 — the reduced 
VAT rate for restaurants and catering services — will increase GDP by 0.1 % and decrease 
the unemployment rate by 0.1 percentage points. 
On 30 May 2012, the Commission adopted the Convergence Report 2012 assessing whether 
Member States with a derogation meet the criteria for adopting the single currency. The report 
concluded that Sweden does not fulfil the criteria of legal compatibility and exchange-rate 
stability and therefore does not qualify for euro adoption. 
2.2. Challenges 
Despite generally favourable economic development, Sweden still faces a set of inter-linked 
policy challenges to sustainable macroeconomic development. The main policy challenges 
have remained broadly unchanged since the 2011 assessment. 
Sweden has a rather high level of private debt, which is accounted for mainly by the non-
financial corporations sector (around 155 % of GDP in 2010), but also the household sector 
(around 82 % of GDP or 170 % of disposable income). While the corporate debt burden has 
decreased substantially since 2009, accumulation of household debt has continued to increase 
even after the 2008-2009 crisis. This has gone hand in hand with strong growth in house 
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prices. Over the last year, however, the upward trend in house prices has reversed and 
household debt has stabilised as a percentage of GDP. Although these developments make the 
challenge less urgent, it remains relevant. The high level of household indebtedness makes 
households’ net wealth more vulnerable to asset price fluctuations, changes in interest rates 
(accentuated by the widespread use of flexible mortgage rates) and the employment outlook. 
There are a number of policies currently in place that may contribute to the volatility of the 
Swedish housing market and mortgage debt accumulation. First, indebtedness of households 
is encouraged by a debt bias in housing taxation generated by generous tax deductibility of 
interest payments and low property taxes. Second, there has also been a trend towards 
increasingly longer amortisation periods, with new mortgage loans typically including no, or 
very limited, amortisation. Third, stringent rent regulation pushes households, instead of 
waiting for a rental apartment, to buy a house or apartment which will quickly meet their need 
for housing services, thus adding to the demand for houses and tenant-owner’s apartments, 
which tend to be mortgage-financed. On the supply side, a local planning monopoly, lengthy 
zoning processes and rules on sub-letting of tenant-owner’s apartments, together with 
insufficient competition in the sectors supplying input to the construction sector, affect the 
flexibility of housing supply, thus contributing to higher house prices. Addressing all the 
above issues is necessary to reduce the risk of debt-driven housing bubbles and to improve the 
functioning of the housing market. 
As regards the labour market, the challenge of low labour market integration of young people 
and immigrants is still relevant. The unemployment rate of young people remains high2 
(22.9 % in 2011), despite some improvement reflecting a general recovery in the labour 
market during 2011. The situation of foreign nationals even deteriorated in 2011, with the 
unemployment rate of this group increasing by almost 1 percentage point (to 20 %) between 
2010 and 2011. Employment rates for 2010 were 38.5 % for young people and 47.6% for non-
EU nationals. Within the latter group, developments have been particularly worrying for 
women. Tackling these adverse developments would be directly in line with the priorities set 
out in the Annual Growth Survey 2012 and is essential for achieving the Europe 2020 
employment target. 
On the supply side, factors behind the relatively high unemployment rates and low 
employment rates for young people and immigrants could include labour taxes and social 
contributions, which remain comparatively high despite extensive government reforms since 
2005. On the demand side, the full integration of vulnerable groups in the labour market could 
be hindered by relatively high wage levels at the low end of the wage scale.3 The differences 
in employment protection between regular and temporary workers constitute another possible 
barrier4. As regards immigrants, there is some evidence that their integration in the labour 
market is occasionally hindered by potential employers’ unequal treatment of foreign-born job 
applicants. Finally, early school leaving also plays an important role in the exclusion of young 
                                                 
2 The low employment rate for young people could be due to the fact that a large proportion of them are 
involved in tertiary education. At the same time, according to Eurostat, students (who are mostly 
looking for employment alongside their studies) represent about half of unemployed youth (the share is 
one third for full-time students according to Swedish national statistics). This pattern seems to be just as 
significant for the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark. In Sweden, however, the level of youth 
unemployment is much higher than in those countries and education appears to absorb young people 
who would otherwise be unemployed. 
3  The employment rate for persons with an upper secondary or post-secondary education is much higher 
than for those with an education below the upper secondary level, whereas the average pay for these 
groups is very close. As suggested in the 2010 Wage Formation Report by the National Institute of 
Economic Research, high minimum wages may tend to curtail employment for groups with limited 
education or low productivity for other reasons. 
4  See the OECD Economic Survey for Sweden, 2011.   
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people and immigrants from the labour market (although drop-out rates are not high in 
relation to the EU as a whole. 
The AGS 2012 requested an integrated assessment of tax policies. In Sweden, the design and 
structure of the tax system could be improved by implementing tax shifts which could make it 
more effective, efficient and growth-enhancing. Rather lenient tax treatment of housing leads 
to a debt bias, which has contributed towards the rising stock of mortgage debt and also, 
potentially, high house prices. A bias towards debt financing could also be observed in 
corporate taxation, contributing to the build-up of corporate debt until 2009. Within 
consumption taxation, the efficiency of VAT could be further enhanced by limiting the use of 
reduced VAT rates. Reforms in VAT and housing taxation could provide room to reduce the 
tax burden on labour, which remains relatively high despite considerable progress in recent 
years and may be discouraging domestic economic activity, employment growth and 
investment. 
Sweden's competitive position is threatened in the medium term by falling business 
investment in R&D and little commercialisation of innovative output. Since 2002 the outflow 
of R&D business investments has exceeded the inflow. Consequently, R&D intensity fell 
from a peak of 4.13 % in 2001 to 3.42 % in 2010. Sweden’s strong R&D position, as seen in 
the Innovation Union Scoreboard, is vulnerable due to its strong dependence on a few large 
multinational companies which are increasingly moving towards the global innovation 
system. Despite being a top performer in most indicators of R&D performance, Sweden is 
below EU average as regards commercialisation of innovative products and services. Also, 
Sweden is slightly lagging behind in  creation of fast-growing innovative enterprises capable 
of ensuring a sustainable and competitive economy for growth and jobs. 
Box 1: Summary of the results of the in-depth review under the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure 
The in-depth review on Sweden identified potential imbalances in the areas of the housing market and 
private debt. 
Although house prices seem to have developed in line with fundamentals, the Swedish housing market 
represents an area where imbalances may emerge. Some policies and features, such as supply 
bottlenecks and rental regulation in combination with changes to the tax system, may have created an 
upward bias in house prices. Some of these policies and institutional features imply distortions or 
represent imperfections that carry an economic efficiency cost and could have a destabilising effect. 
Their interaction with tax policies and institutional features in the Swedish mortgage market, such as 
generous interest deductibility on mortgages and little amortisation, could also potentially increase the 
cost of these. 
Despite some mitigating circumstances, the high level of private-sector debt, in particular household 
indebtedness, deserves attention. While corporate debt makes up the largest share of total private-
sector debt, there are specific factors behind it (mainly the strong role of multi-nationals and of 
intercompany loans) which makes it less of a concern. In the case of household debt, however, the 
high debt level implies a heightened risk to macroeconomic stability by making households’ balance 
sheets more sensitive to negative shocks, such as a fall in house prices, a prolonged period of low or 
negative economic growth or a real interest rate shock. In view of that risk, and the potential role of 
various policies in stimulating continued debt build-up, such as generous interest rate deductibility, 
close monitoring may be warranted. 
The policy response could include measures to foster prudent lending, reduce the debt-bias in housing 
taxation, strengthen mortgage amortisation requirements and promote the use of fixed interest rate 
mortgages. Possible measures to improve the flexibility of housing supply include simplification of the 
planning and zoning processes, fostering competition in the construction sector and further easing the 
regulation of the rental market. 
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3. ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICY AGENDA 
3.1. Fiscal policy and taxation 
Budgetary developments and debt dynamics 
The main goal of the government's budgetary strategy, as expressed in the 2012 Convergence 
Programme (henceforth ‛programme’), is to ensure long-term sustainability by respecting the 
rules of the Swedish fiscal framework, including the target of having a surplus in general 
government net lending of 1% of GDP over the cycle. The strategy also aims at fulfilling the 
requirements of the stability and growth pact, notably respecting the 3% deficit limit and 
establishing a medium-term budgetary objective (MTO). Until 2011, the government 
maintained the MTO at the same level as the surplus target, i.e. at 1% of GDP. The 
programme announces that, as from 2012, the MTO will be a deficit of 1% of GDP. The new 
MTO adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth pact. The reduction is 
explained by a wish to ‛distinguish more clearly between the Swedish national framework and 
the demands made of Sweden as a member of the EU’ and the lower target should be seen as 
a minimum requirement for net lending following from the fact that Sweden is a member of 
the EU. The programme states that the guiding principle for the government's fiscal policy 
strategy will continue to be the more demanding 1% surplus-over-the-cycle target. 
As in 2010, general government net lending showed a small surplus of 0.3% of GDP in 2011. 
This compares to an expected surplus of 0.6% of GDP in last year's programme, with the 
difference stemming from somewhat slower revenue growth than expected. Based on a no-
policy change assumption, the programme foresees a small deficit of 0.1% of GDP in 2012, 
turning into a surplus of 0.5% of GDP in 2013, as the economy is expected to recover 
strongly. In the Commission’s spring forecast, the general government balance is forecast to 
show a deficit of 0.3% of GDP in 2012 and a surplus of 0.1% of GDP in 2013, based on a 
more muted recovery. Compared with last year's programme, both the 2012 programme and 
the Commission’s spring forecast foresees a much lower government balance in 2012, based 
primarily on revenues not being as strong as expected, but also on expenditures being 
somewhat higher. For 2013, the programme predicts that household consumption will grow at 
a much faster pace than foreseen by the Commission’s spring forecast, based on the 
assumption that households will start reducing their saving rate. For 2014 and 2015, surpluses 
of 1.7% and 3.0% of GDP are foreseen, respectively, based on a favourable macroeconomic 
scenario, with strong employment growth as a result of earlier government labour-market and 
tax reforms. Should the effects of these reforms be less than expected or materialise at a 
slower pace, there might be slower revenue growth, which would have a negative impact on 
the general government balance. Expenditure restraint is expected to be the main contributor 
to the improvement in the fiscal balance over the programme period. Assuming unchanged 
policies, the programme forecasts that expenditures will fall by 3.3 % of GDP over the 
programme period. 
The programme foresees a structural general government balance, as recalculated by the 
Commission5, of 1.0% and 1.6% of GDP in 2012 and 2013, respectively, whereas the 
Commission’s forecast foresees the structural balance growing from 0.0% of GDP in 2011 to 
0.3% and 0.4% of GDP in 2012 and 2013, respectively. As the MTO has been lowered to -1% 
of GDP as from 2012, it means that it is likely to be met over the period covered by the 
programme, even taking into account the likelihood of further expansionary discretionary 
                                                 
5  Cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, recalculated by the Commission 
services on the basis of the information provided in the programme, using the commonly agreed 
methodology 
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measures being taken in 2013 or 2014. These could derive from a need to restore the real 
value of such expenditure items that are not indexed to inflation or income growth. 
According to the information provided in the programme, in 2012 the growth rate of 
government expenditure, net of discretionary revenue measures, will exceed a rate which is 
lower than the reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth (1.84%) and which 
ensures an annual structural adjustment towards the MTO by 0.5% of GDP (0.85%). In 2013 
and the later years, by contrast, it will not exceed the reference medium-term rate of potential 
GDP growth (1.84%). Following an overall assessment of the Member State’s budgetary 
plans, with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of 
discretionary revenue measures, the plans have been found to be consistent with continued 
fulfilment of the MTO. 
 
 Box 2: Main budgetary measures  
 Revenue Expenditure  
 2011  
 • Increase in basic income deduction for 
+65 year-olds (-0.2% of GDP) 
  
 2012  
 • Lower VAT rate for restaurant and 
catering services (-0.2% of GDP) 
• Higher spending on infrastructure 
(+0.1% of GDP) 
 
 Note: The budgetary impact in the table is the impact reported in the programme, i.e. by the national 
authorities. A positive sign implies that revenue / expenditure increases as a consequence of this measure. 
The degree of detail reflects the type of information made available in the stability or convergence 
programme and, where available, of a multiannual budget. 
 
 
 
The debt ratio has shown a declining trend since the mid-1990s. The recession of 2008/09 
only temporarily interrupted this process and gross debt stood at 38.4% of GDP in 2011. Over 
the programme period, the programme foresees a further decline in the debt ratio to 27.5% of 
GDP in 2015, with the main driver being large primary balances, but also a substantial 
contribution from real GDP growth. This decline is based on a rather favourable 
macroeconomic scenario and includes the effects from some limited further privatisation 
receipts. In 2011, Sweden had a positive net financial position of 18.4% of GDP. Since the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is below the reference rate, the debt reduction benchmark is not applicable. 
Long-term sustainability 
The long-term change in age-related expenditure is above the EU average. The initial 
budgetary position offsets the long-term costs. Under a no-policy change assumption, debt 
would fall to 23% of GDP by 2020. Full implementation of the programme plans would 
reduce debt faster. Ensuring continued sufficient primary surpluses over the medium-term, as 
planned in the programme update, would further improve the sustainability of public finances. 
Fiscal framework 
The Swedish budgetary framework has been gradually taking shape since the second half of 
the 1990s in reaction to the significant worsening of public finances during the deep recession 
of the early 1990s. The current fiscal framework has successfully contributed to putting 
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Swedish public finances on a much stronger footing at both the central and the local level. It 
has played a specific role in preventing strong tax receipts in good times from translating into 
pro-cyclical spending increases. This has provided the necessary margin for automatic 
stabilisers to play their role in recessions, even making room for discretionary fiscal stimulus. 
The framework is based on three main rules. First, the surplus target, encompassing the 
finances of both central and local governments (counties and municipalities) and the pension 
system, stipulates that an overall surplus of 1 % of GDP should be achieved over the business 
cycle. The achievement of the target is assessed against seven different indicators. The 
multitude of indicators impairs the clarity of the assessment and could lead to an opportunistic 
interpretation. Second, the three-year nominal expenditure ceiling for central government 
(excluding interest expenditure) and the pension system controls budget overruns and forces 
government departments to prioritise. Third, the balanced-budget rule for local governments 
forbids municipalities and counties to approve ex-ante deficit budgets and requires them to 
compensate for any ex-post deficits within three years. In addition to the budgetary rules, the 
Fiscal Policy Council was established in 2007 with the task of providing an independent 
evaluation of the government’s fiscal policy and compliance with the fiscal rules. 
The fiscal framework has been reinforced in recent years by the adoption in 2010 of a law 
making it a legal obligation to define the surplus target and specify the expenditure ceiling for 
the coming three years. In an agreement reached in 2011 among all major political parties in 
Parliament, the Fiscal Council received an expanded mandate and some additional resources. 
This represents a strengthening of the Council, as previously it had not enjoyed broad support 
in Parliament. 
Tax system 
Sweden is a high-tax country with a tax-to-GDP ratio of 45.8 % in 2010, well above the EU 
average. Overall, the tax policy mix is sound, moving slowly from labour taxation to other 
sources of taxation generally regarded as less harmful to growth. Although the share of 
‘growth-friendly taxes’ is substantial, there is scope for further growth-enhancing tax shifts 
(from labour to housing taxation) and for important efficiency improvements (housing, VAT, 
corporate taxation). Tax administration is among the most efficient in the EU, with high tax 
compliance rates and low tax collection costs. 
Taxation of housing in Sweden is characterised by a debt bias, generated by low recurrent 
property taxes (reduced significantly in 2008) and generous tax reliefs for mortgage interest 
payments. The deduction scheme and property taxes in their current form are also regressive, 
as the former benefits borrowers with high capital and labour income, against which interest 
expenses can be deducted and property taxes are kept flat above a certain threshold. In order 
to make the tax system more debt-neutral, return on housing investments could be taxed as 
other returns (via the imputed rent or higher property taxes) or the interest tax relief could be 
reduced or phased out. The timing of these reforms would need to be decided carefully, in 
order not to put excessive downward pressure on house prices. 
Within corporate taxation, there is a relatively large gap between the effective marginal tax 
rate on debt and on equity for new investment, suggesting a bias towards debt-financing for 
corporations. Correcting the debt bias in both housing and corporate taxation is important in 
view of the high level of household and corporate debt. 
The efficiency of VAT could be further enhanced through a shift towards a more harmonised 
VAT structure6. The application of reduced rates complicates the system and distorts the 
                                                 
6 The standard rate of 25 % is high, but reduced rates are applied e.g. to food, restaurant and catering 
services (12 %), a range of cultural goods and public transport (both 6 %), and some items are fully exempt. 
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functioning of the market. Moreover, even if the various reduced rates have been motivated 
by specific policy concerns, a reduced VAT rate is normally not the most effective or efficient 
policy measure to achieve these aims. This is likely to be also the case with the reduced VAT 
rate for restaurant and catering services which was introduced in January 2012 with a view to 
boosting youth employment. Experience from other countries shows that these measures have 
been criticised as costly, with a limited impact on employment.7 
Fiscal space provided by the abovementioned reforms could be used to reduce labour taxation 
further, and this could enhance growth. The government has implemented several reforms in 
recent years to lower the tax burden on labour. In particular, the in-work tax credit, introduced 
in four stages over the period 2007-2010, reduced the marginal and average tax rates. 
However, the marginal tax rates for above-average wage earners and the average tax wedge 
remain high. Similarly, the implicit tax rate on labour (39 % in 2010) remains above the EU 
average (non-weighted 32.9 %, weighted 36 %), despite a significant decline over the last 
decade. 
The government is not contemplating any major changes to the tax system in the near future. 
A further reduction in labour taxes through a fifth stage of the in-work tax credit scheme 
remains one of the reform ambitions, but the government has announced that there might not 
be sufficient fiscal space to implement it before 2014-2015. Given the generally good fiscal 
position, the space for a more counter-cyclical impact might deserve more attention. The 
government has launched an inquiry to review corporate taxation which will issue 
recommendations in 2013. 
3.2. Financial sector 
The Swedish financial sector is in relatively good shape. Swedish banks are well capitalised, 
with capital ratios already meeting Basel III requirements8. Their exposure to countries in 
receipt of EU or IMF financial assistance has declined to a very low level. Banks’ profitability 
measured as returns on equity has improved over the last year, and the share of loans losses 
has declined (0.04 % of total lending in mid-2011). From a company perspective, too, access 
to finance does not pose a serious challenge in Sweden9. However, as discussed in section 2.2, 
the Swedish financial sector remains vulnerable to developments in the housing market due to 
high household debt. Also, the financial sector continues to face risks related to its strong 
international exposure and a heavy reliance on external short-term funding. 
                                                 
7  See footnote 12. 
8  Moreover, no Swedish institution was below the required 5 % core Tier 1 capital following the July 
2011 EBA stress test nor required to comply with the higher minimum core Tier 1 capital ratio of 9 % of 
risk-weighted assets following the temporary recapitalisation plan adopted by the European Council in 
October 2011. 
9  The 2011 survey on SME access to finance shows that only 8 % of companies in Sweden report access 
to finance as being the most pressing problem (EU average: 15 %). 
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Box 3: The Swedish housing market 
From the second half of the 1990s until the onset of the financial crisis, house prices in Sweden rose sharply. 
When the financial crisis hit, house prices started to fall, though their correction proved fairly muted and since 
2009, house prices resumed their strong up-ward movement reaching a new all-time high in 2010. During 2011, 
house prices in Sweden have been rather stable, with some downward movement accelerating in the fourth 
quarter of 2011 
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There is no straightforward way of assessing whether house prices are now at a level in line with fundamentals. 
At least on some metrics, house prices now look richly valued (e.g. price-to-rent ratio, affordability ratios). The 
price-to-disposable-income-per-capita ratio is still some 25% above its mid-1990s level and close to its recent 
peaks. However, these valuations are based on historical average values. Indicators which take into account 
possible structural changes as well as econometric estimates suggest that the steady increase in house prices over 
the last 15 years may well be justified by fundamentals, such as strong disposable income growth and low 
interest rates coupled with limitations on the supply-side. 
There are reasonable explanations why Swedish house prices have avoided the steep correction seen in many 
other countries in recent years. The quick recovery from the 2008/09 recession, which was helped by significant 
monetary and fiscal stimulus, and a relatively resilient labour market explains why disposable income has 
continued to rise at a respectable pace also in the more recent period. Some specific tax measures favoring 
housing (such as significant decrease in property taxation and deduction schemes for home improvement 
services) have also added to demand for owner-occupied housing, as has rental regulation. The trend decline in 
mortgage rates, in combination with reduced amortization requirements, also fuelled demand over the last 
decade. On the supply side, a number of factors have contributed to a rather muted supply expansion over the 
same period. The effects from the crisis of the early 1990s and the 1991 tax reform lead to a sharp contraction of 
the construction sector, which has taken a long time to recover from. Poor competition and administrative 
uncertainty in relation to zoning and issuance of building permits may also have held back supply by raising 
costs. Thus, contrary to Spain and Ireland for instance, Sweden did not experience an overexpansion of the 
construction sector, as increased demand for housing mainly manifested itself in higher prices and less in 
increasing volumes. 
Although house prices seem to have developed in line with fundamentals, the Swedish housing market 
represents an area where an imbalanced development could emerge. Some policies and features, such as supply 
bottlenecks and rental regulation in combination with changes to the tax system, may have created an upward 
bias in house prices. Some of these policies and institutional features (a widespread use of variable-rate 
mortgages and little amortisation)  imply distortions or represent imperfections that carry an economic efficiency 
cost and could have a destabilising effect. Their interaction with tax policies, such as generous interest 
deductibility on mortgages and low property taxes, could also potentially increase the cost of these. 
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The challenge of high house prices and household indebtedness were highlighted in a 
recommendation given to Sweden in 2011. The government’s response to the specific risk of 
house prices has so far been rather limited. This has to be seen against the background of a 
housing market situation which has stabilised since the recommendation was issued. The 
government has set up an advisory committee to analyse developments in house prices and 
household indebtedness and suggest, by August 2012, possible reforms. While the focus of 
this inquiry is relevant, there is no guarantee that it will lead to any actual measures10. In 
2011, the government also marginally eased regulation of the rental market. In its 2012 spring 
bill, the government proposes some measures to simplify the sub-letting of apartments and to 
stimulate housing construction. Also, it refers to a new act to simplify the planning and 
building permits processes. Although certainly welcome, these measures are not likely to be 
sufficient to address the issues involved. The intended lowering of the property fee for rental 
units and for construction of new housing, as well as higher tax deductions for revenues of 
home rentals, are likely to increase the availability of housing, but a more systematic solution 
would have been preferred, based on elimination of tax distortions and rent regulation. 
Continuous efforts are needed to achieve a well-functioning rental market and to tackle the 
constraints on the housing supply. 
In broader terms, the government has been addressing the challenge of household 
indebtedness by strengthening the resilience of the financial sector. A number of measures 
have been taken in this respect. Above all, the crisis-related more stringent rules for Swedish 
banks’ capital adequacy have been extended beyond the end of 2011. In November 2011, the 
authorities had already announced higher capital requirements for four systemically important 
banks, above the Basel III requirements and ahead of the Basel III implementation schedule. 
With a view to strengthening supervision capacity, the resources of the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority have been reinforced. The Financial Crisis Committee was appointed 
in 2011 to review the rules for managing a financial crisis. In order to counter liquidity risks, 
plans were announced to meet the short-term liquidity requirement of Basel III ahead of the 
agreed timetable, with the euro and the US dollar being treated separately. Moreover, banks 
should continue to reduce the differences in maturity between assets and liabilities, and 
improve their public liquidity reporting. 
The measures taken by the government are relevant, but focus mainly on strengthening the 
resilience of the financial sector. In this area, the efforts to increase capital requirements and 
advance liquidity requirements for banks are ambitious compared to other EU Member States. 
Nevertheless, measures to foster prudent lending and diminish the debt bias in the financing 
of housing investment have so far received less attention, apart from the introduction in the 
autumn of 2010 of a cap of 85 % on the loan-to-value ratio. Furthermore, despite some 
promising steps, the system of rent regulation and the major constraints on housing 
construction remain in place. In this light, the recommendation on housing and the financial 
sector is considered to have been partially implemented. 
In line with the Annual Growth Survey objectives, the capital positions of the systemic banks 
have been strengthened without restricting lending to the economy. Credit growth to the 
private sector has been overall stable (between 5 and 6 % during 2011), with credit to 
households slowing down and credit to non-financial corporations accelerating. 
 
                                                 
10  The previous inquiry, which delivered its results in October 2010, focused on various aspects including 
housing supply, rent regulation and mobility in the housing market, but its conclusions were only very 
tentative and did not provide concrete recommendations for policy action in this field. 
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3.3. Labour market, education and social policy 
The performance of the Swedish labour market is generally very good: the overall 
employment rate is very high (78.7 %, 2010); labour productivity is above the EU average; the 
wage-setting system is rather flexible and accommodates cyclical developments well; the 
dialogue between the social partners is consensus-oriented and efficient in preventing strikes; 
the system of unemployment benefits as well as the sickness and disability benefit schemes 
have become more supportive of labour integration and employment; and substantial progress 
has been made in reducing labour taxes. Nevertheless, well-targeted policy action is 
warranted in several areas, in particular in addressing persistent and relatively high 
unemployment rates as well as low employment rates for young people and non-EU nationals. 
The need to tackle the weak labour market participation of young people and immigrants was 
identified in a country-specific recommendation for Sweden in the 2011 assessment and was 
also highlighted as a general priority in the Annual Growth Strategy 2012. The Swedish 
Budget Bill for 2012, presented in September 2011, included numerous measures in response 
to the recommendation. The measures in favour of youth employment include: lowering the 
VAT rate for restaurants and catering services; implementing the apprenticeship programme 
as a permanent part of upper secondary school; introducing a reform aimed at increasing the 
number of students leaving upper secondary school with passes in all subjects; and ensuring a 
better match between upper secondary school and the labour market. With a view to 
improving the labour market integration of immigrants, the measures include: further 
monitoring of, and improvements to, the reformed reception system for newly arrived 
refugees; evaluation of the effectiveness of Swedish language training for immigrants; 
launching an inquiry aimed at proposing by October 2012 measures to speed up integration in 
the labour market of female immigrants and immigrants arriving in Sweden on the basis of 
family reunification (60 % women), as well as subsidies for employers who hire unemployed 
immigrants. 
Most of these measures are relevant and can be expected to have a positive impact. However, 
since most reforms are not being implemented until 2012, it is too early to assess whether they 
have actually had any significant effects on the target groups. The relevance and effectiveness 
of the main measure targeted at youth employment — the VAT reduction for restaurants and 
catering services — could be called into question. As experience from other Member States 
indicates11, there is some doubt concerning the effect which this tax expenditure measure has 
on job creation and growth. The Swedish VAT reform will be evaluated by several 
government agencies, with final reports to be provided in January 2016. A short-term 
evaluation of the price impact will be presented already in July 2012. 
In addition to the measures included in the Budget Bill 2012, the NRP reports on initiatives 
which aim at improving the functioning of the Swedish labour market, including in the field 
of employment protection and wage formation. The government is considering options to 
prevent exploitation of fixed-term employment. In addition, a public inquiry is examining 
whether employer costs related to employment termination disputes can be reduced. –Another 
public examination has been instructed to investigate and, by 30 November 2012, propose 
solutions for a new form of employment with an educational content for young people – 
apprentice probation employment. In addition, the government offices are making 
                                                 
11  For Finland, see Iida Häkkinen Skans and Tuomas Kosonen, Sänkt moms på frisörverksamhet och 
restauranger i Finland: Blev det verkligen lägre priser och högre sysselsättning?, Ekonomisk Debatt nr 
5 2011; Konjunkturinstitutet, Yttrande på promemorian ‘Sänkt restaurang- och cateringmoms’ (dnr 
Fi2011/1404). For France, see e.g. the report from the "Conseil des Prélèvements Obligatoires", 
http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/CPO/documents/divers/Rapport_de_synthese_Entreprises_et_niches_fiscales
_et_sociales_071010.pdf , page 200 and following. Estimates of the effects of a VAT reduction for 
restaurants in  Belgium suggest a similar conclusion.   
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preparations for the introduction of a special form of employment for upper secondary school 
apprentices. All these initiatives represent promising steps towards more flexibility at the low 
end of the wage scale, benefiting young and low-skilled people, and towards reducing the 
employment protection divide between permanent and temporary workers. However, they are 
still in an embryonic stage and the result will depend on the reaction of the social partners. 
To summarise, the government strategy to improve labour market participation of young 
people and immigrants has so far mainly focused on active labour market policy measures. 
Previous measures in this field have not generated significant and lasting positive effects. It is 
too early to see the results of the measures implemented in 2012. In order to handle the 
challenges in a more comprehensive way, a more determined effort in areas such as 
employment protection and high wages at the lower end of the wage skill might be required. 
Initiatives announced in the NRP are promising steps in that direction, but it is to be seen 
whether they will translate into palpable results. In the field of labour taxation, there is a clear 
risk that none of the remaining reform ambitions set out in the previous NRP will be 
implemented over the programme period, in particular the fifth stage in the in-work tax credit 
scheme and a further increase in the threshold for the state income tax,. The government has 
indicated that sufficient fiscal space for these reforms might not be available until 2014-2015. 
In the light of these observations, the recommendation on labour market integration is 
considered to have been partially implemented. 
As regards progress towards the Europe 2020 targets, it can be expected that the 
apprenticeship programme, the reform of upper secondary education and the new measures 
targeting immigrants will be the main measures which will have a positive impact on the 2020 
employment target, as well as the early school leaving target and the target to reduce the 
number of people at risk of poverty. Earlier measures might have contributed already to the 
improvement in the employment rate since 2009. However, such a conclusion would be 
premature given the difficulty of disentangling the effect of a cyclical upturn in employment 
from the effect of the government measures. 
The use of the European Social Fund in Sweden support numerous projects that help fight 
unemployment and social exclusion, especially for the most vulnerable groups among young 
people and immigrants. On a critical view, it is noted that the Swedish government in its 
budget for 2012 decreased the limit for outstanding ESF commitments at the end of the year 
by 20% compared to 2011, which leads to a less effective use of the ESF for this purpose in 
the years 2012-2014. This is in contradiction with one of the objectives set out in the Annual 
Growth Survey 2012, mobilising and making better use of the available EU funds to 
implement the recommendations on the labour market, and goes against the spirit of the recent 
Commission's Youth Opportunities Initiative. 
The Swedish social model is characterised by a well-developed universal social protection 
system and an active labour market policy. Expenditure on social protection as a percentage 
of GDP has constantly been among the highest in the EU (in 2009 SE: 32.1 %, EU-27: 
29.5 %). The social protection system has remained solid throughout the economic crisis, 
reflecting stable public finances. Sweden has not been forced to introduce any austerity 
measures in the social protection system. As a result, the combined at-risk-of poverty and 
social exclusion rate has been stable over the last few years (2007: 14.5 %, 2010: 15 %). 
Sweden is one of the Member States with the lowest income inequalities (ranking second in 
2010, against the EU average of 23.3 %)12. 
                                                 
12  The risk of poverty is considerably higher for those born outside the EU (32.4 % in 2010), non-EU 
citizens (51.3 % in 2010), the unemployed (48.9 % in 2010), elderly women (21.6 % in 2010) and single 
people with dependent children (37.5 %, 2010). 
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Despite a slight improvement in the overall at-risk-of-poverty and social-exclusion indicator 
in 2010, the situation has not improved for some vulnerable groups. The negative trends 
concern the elderly (especially women), in-work poverty for women, child poverty and the 
impact of social expenditure in reducing child poverty (see statistical annexes). The issue 
looks even more worrying from a longer-term and EU-wide perspective. While the risk of 
poverty and social exclusion decreased in the EU over the period 2007-2010 for people above 
65 by 4.7 pps (by 3.4 pps for women), it increased in Sweden by 5.5 pps (by 8.7 pps for 
women). 
The Swedish government’s overall policy objective is strongly focused on reducing social 
exclusion through labour market integration. Increased labour market inclusion for groups 
with a weak foothold on the labour market, such as immigrants and young people, will lead to 
a significant reduction in social exclusion for those vulnerable groups. This is also the main 
purpose of a key measure taken recently to combat social exclusion — the reform of the 
reception system for asylum seekers and their families introduced in December 2010. The 
reform aims to improve the labour market inclusion of immigrants by shifting responsibility 
for activation measures from the municipalities to the Swedish Public Employment Service. 
The objective is to harmonise the quality of introduction measures, strengthen personal 
incentives for taking up jobs and provide adequate individualised guidance. 
However, there are vulnerable groups, such as elderly women with low pension earnings and 
single households with children, for whom labour market inclusion is not always an effective 
or realistic method of reducing the risk of poverty. As a result, the overall policy focus on 
labour market inclusion as a way of reducing the risk of poverty should be complemented by 
other policies as well. 
As regards education, early school leaving fell below the 10 % target in 2010 and continues to 
decrease. Sweden has thus already reached the national target set for 2020. The main measure 
in the fight against early school leaving has been the implementation of the upper secondary 
reform beginning in the 2011-2012 school year, further differentiating the vocational track 
and mainstreaming the apprenticeship system to make upper secondary vocational training 
more relevant to labour market needs. As regards tertiary education attainment, Sweden had 
already exceeded its 2020 target (40-45 %) in 2010, with 45.8 % of graduates in the 30-34 age 
group. 
Nevertheless, the declining quality of school education, as illustrated in international test 
results (OECD PISA in 2009), and the continuing lack of attractiveness of the teaching 
profession remain major points of concern. The government adopted a range of measures to 
tackle this: a new Education Act strengthening rights to learning support; new curricula to 
better prepare upper secondary school students for the labour market; a programme for 
strengthening education in mathematics, natural sciences and technology; a reform of initial 
teacher education under the so-called ‛Boost for teachers‛' initiative; and additional resources 
for the continuing professional development of teachers. The high average age of university 
entrants, significant drop-out rates from higher education (46 % in 2008)13 and the rather late 
graduation of university students lead to a relatively belated entry of graduates into the labour 
market. This accounts for among the highest cumulative expenditure per student over the 
average duration of tertiary studies. The reforms initiated recently and described in the NRP 
such as the quality-based resource allocation starting in 2013 should strengthen the role of 
higher education institutions in the knowledge triangle. Overall, Sweden has introduced a 
large number of relevant and ambitious reforms, particularly in school education. There is, 
                                                 
13 OECD, Education at a Glance 2010. This includes students entering single courses who may never have 
intended to study all the courses required for a degree, an estimated 40 % in Sweden. 
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however, a need for better coordination of these measures, particularly with regard to early 
school leaving and to reducing the incidence of dropping out from tertiary education. 
3.4. Structural measures supporting growth and competitiveness 
Sweden ranks among the most competitive economies in the world, taking into account 
factors such as labour productivity, knowledge and skills levels, infrastructure, eco-efficiency, 
innovation capacity and the business environment. Sweden is above the EU average in these 
areas and did not receive any country-specific recommendations in the field of structural 
reforms in 2011. 
Research and innovation 
Sweden has the second highest level of R&D expenditure as a share of GDP and is considered 
to be an innovation leader according to the Innovation Union Scoreboard. However, several 
shortcomings have been identified that hinder further progress in the area of research and 
innovation. First of all, the commercialisation of innovative products is rather weak with the 
indicator of ’Sales of new to market and new to firm innovation’ below the EU average and 
showing a negative trend.14 Also, Sweden appears to be lagging behind in creating fast-
growing innovative enterprises. It creates new firms in innovative sectors, but these firms are 
not growing to the same extent as in other European countries. The patenting activity of 
young firms in Sweden (less than 5 years) is clearly lower than that of young firms in the 
United States or other Nordic countries.15 
The Swedish innovation environment seems to be loosing the ability to retain and attract 
business R&D investments and innovation chains. Business R&D intensity has declined 
significantly over the last years16, largely reflecting reallocation of business R&D investment 
by large companies outside Sweden17. As a result, progress towards the national R&D target 
of 4 % of GDP has ceased, with R&D intensity declining from a peak of 4.13 % in 2001 to 
3.42 % in 2010. Within the business sector, R&D investment is very much concentrated in a 
few large companies18, which renders the apparently favourable position of Sweden 
vulnerable (also in view of the fact that many big R&D investors in Sweden are now foreign-
owned). At the same time, R&D investments in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises has 
fallen almost 30% between 2005 and 2009. 
Sweden is a relatively small country in population terms and the Swedish research and 
innovation system depends on its being integrated into the expanding European research and 
innovation system to access knowledge in strategic areas for the country and to achieve a 
critical mass. In this respect, the public sector could make more progress. Currently, only the 
most research-intensive universities in Sweden cooperate extensively with international 
partners, which means they miss out on the more intensive cooperation taking place among 
top universities in other European countries. 
                                                 
14  Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011. 
15  Innovation Union Competitiveness report 2011. 
16  R&D financed by business enterprises as a % of GDP fell from 2.96% in 2001 to 2.12% in 2009, the 
largest decrease among all EU Member States. In fact, most world competitors to Sweden increased 
their business R&D investment intensity over the same period. 
17  Inward business R&D expenditure to Sweden decreased by 11% between 2003 and 2007, while 
outward R&D investment from Sweden increased by 49% over that period. Declining overall business 
R&D expenditure between 2007 and 2010 suggest that this trend continued  in the subsequent period. 
18  When foreign affiliates in Sweden are also taken into account, around 65-70 % of private R&D is 
performed by large companies while 98 % of all Swedish companies are SMEs. In recent years, 
employment growth has no longer been based in multinational firms in Sweden but in small and 
medium-sized enterprises.   
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Over the last five years, several initiatives have been launched to enhance the effectiveness of 
the Swedish research and innovation system, with a focus on innovation in SMEs through 
reinforced cooperation with universities and better access to seed funding and venture capital. 
Interesting proposals have also been made more recently for both demand-side measures (i.e. 
introducing a new procurement law, fostering innovation-friendly procurement) and supply-
side measures (in particular to fund testing, demonstration infrastructure and incubators of 
new research-based products)19. A reform of the early-stage financing system, in order to 
streamline it and gain synergy effects, is outlined in the NRP. These initiatives are relevant, 
but additional value could be produced if these supply-side and demand-side measures were 
linked more closely to each other. 
The new Innovation Bill, planned for adoption at the end of 2012, provides an opportunity to 
address the weaknesses in the Swedish research and innovation system in a comprehensive 
way. An effort is needed to restore the attractiveness of the business environment for private 
R&I investments by introducing schemes to encourage young innovative firms to develop 
new technologies and innovative solutions and by developing stronger incentives for science-
industry cooperation targeting in particular large firms established in Sweden. Through a 
more strategic use of EU Structural Funds for R&D&I, it should be possible to further 
develop smart specialisation and international linkages as well as strengthen co-ordination 
between national and regional initiatives20. Key initiatives could include investments in 
innovative SMEs along the entire innovation value chain and the swift commercial 
exploitation of research and innovation results. The state could also play a stronger brokerage 
role, fostering research and innovation partnerships between the business sector and 
universities and research institutions. 
Environment, energy and transport 
Sweden has developed a good mix of measures to promote energy efficiency, including fiscal, 
financial, legislative, information and voluntary instruments. These measures are supported at 
various governance levels (national, regional and local) and tackle all sectors of the economy. 
Additional energy-saving potential could be identified by examining the interaction between 
the systematic use of combined heat and power on the one hand and building insulation on the 
other. 
Sweden has committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 17% (compared to 2005 
and only for emissions not covered by the EU Emission Trading System) by 2020. According 
to 2011 projections taking into account existing measures, Sweden is expected to be very 
close to reaching its national target. Nevertheless, given the already low level of emissions, 
abatement costs are likely to rise in the future, putting emphasis on the cost-effectiveness of 
Sweden’s climate change policies. A number of measures have been adopted recently to cut 
emissions from the transport sector (e.g. hike in fuel taxes, new vehicle tax rules), which 
together with the agriculture sector are the main producers of GHG emissions in the country. 
As regards renewable energy, Sweden is well on track to reach its commitments under the 
Europe 2020 strategy (49 % share of renewable energy in final energy consumption, 10 % 
share in the transport sector by 2020). As Sweden is already advanced in the field of 
renewables, energy efficiency and carbon emissions, costs of accommodating even higher 
                                                 
19 Vinnova policy VP 2011:04; Vinnova Information VI 2011:09; Erawatch country report 2010. 
20  EU structural funds can play an important role here as they provide 40-50 % of public regional support 
for research and innovation with a particular focus on SMEs. Large regional disparities in R&D 
expenditure should also be taken into account (R&D expenditure at NUTS 2 level ranging from 0.9 % 
of GDP to 4.7 % of GDP in 2009, thus revealing large variations in proximity to the national R&D 
target).   
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standards are likely to rise in the future. The EU structural funds could increasingly be used to 
help Sweden achieve its targets in these areas. 
Despite the increases in energy and CO2 taxes in 2011, the taxation system still has the 
potential to shift towards a greener taxation scheme. In particular, it would be beneficial to 
address the large number of exemptions and differentiated tax rates with a view to increasing 
the cost-effectiveness and the overall efficiency of environmental taxation21. The intention  to 
carry out a comprehensive survey on potentially environmentally harmful subsidies,  
announced in the NRP, is welcome and should be pursued to deliver clear proposals on how 
these subsidies should be eliminated. 
In the waste sector, Sweden has succeeded in achieving a low landfill rate (1 %). However, 
given the high incineration rate (49 %), there is less focus on prevention and diverting waste 
from incineration to recycling. This is the result of a deliberate policy to generate 
energy/heating and has led to the establishment of high cost infrastructure, which the 
authorities feel a need to use. Shifting the focus from incineration to recycling would not only 
significantly reduce direct and indirect GHG emissions, but would also generate benefits in 
terms of job creation22. 
Energy infrastructure is well developed, although improving the connection between surplus 
generation areas in the north of the country and deficit consumption areas in the south, as well 
as cross-border connections, would be worthwhile with a view to improving the stability of 
the electricity supply. Notwithstanding the small size of the gas market, total dependence on a 
single interconnection and a heavy reliance on foreign storage facilities increase Sweden’s 
vulnerability to distortions in gas supply. 
The overall situation of the transport infrastructure network is quite satisfactory. An 
increasing share of GDP is being invested in transport infrastructure. Nevertheless, in addition 
to bottlenecks in the main cities, one main area of concern is the low level of investment in 
the maintenance and upgrading of the Swedish rail system, which has clearly not kept pace 
with the increase in traffic over recent years. Capacity is constrained partly because the 
network is mostly single track and carries traffic types with different quality needs. In 2011 
Sweden announced that work on railway operation and maintenance would be stepped up. 
These challenges should also be addressed in the upcoming proposal for infrastructure 
decisions announced in the Swedish NRP. 
Internal market and competition 
Sweden is one of the Member States that transposed the Services Directive within the 
transposition deadline, involving a considerable number of amendments to national laws. In 
particular, Sweden has amended its law on foreign branches and has removed the obstacles 
created by numerous formalities and a cross-cutting establishment requirement. The Swedish 
point of single contact is well installed, but the clarity of the information could be improved 
(such as the search function), and it could be made easier for foreign users to complete the 
procedure (including developing ways of accepting foreign-issued e-identification). 
Sweden is also a top performer in implementing the digital agenda. It ranked first out of 142 
countries in the Global Information Technology Report 2012 by the World Economic Forum. 
E-commerce is widely used both in national on-line shopping (65.7 % of Sweden's population 
compared to 40.4 % in the EU in 2010) and in cross-border on-line shopping (12.7 % 
                                                 
21  The impact of the carbon tax on GHG emissions from the industrial sector has been lowered by 
exemptions for petroleum, mineral products and metal industries.     
22 Limiting energy recovery to non-recyclable waste could create more than 2.000 jobs and increase the 
annual turnover of the waste sector by over EUR 240 million in Sweden. European Commission, 
Implementing EU waste legislation for green growth, 2012. 
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compared to 8.8 %). For SMEs, Sweden is the best performer with respect to on-line 
purchasing (52.6 % compared to 26.4 %) and scores well above the average for on-line selling 
(23.5 % compared to 12.8 %). 
In the field of competition, Sweden is one of the Member States that has made the most 
progress over the past decade. Nevertheless, there is still scope for further improvement in 
several areas. The wide range of commercial activities run by municipalities in some sectors 
can result in unfair competition between publicly owned companies and private actors, 
especially in public procurement. Although the Swedish Competition Authority was given 
ample powers to act against commercial activities run by public authorities (municipalities), 
so far these powers have not been used. Also, there is a need to reinforce internal scrutiny and 
compliance mechanisms as regards state aid. 
3.5. Modernisation of public administration 
Swedish public administration is generally regarded as efficient, providing comprehensive 
services of a high quality to both citizens and enterprises. This strong performance is based on 
a high degree of openness and transparency in public administration, strong respect for the 
rule of law and consensual decision-making. Sweden consistently ranks among the world’s 
least corrupt nations (it ranked 4th in the 2011 corruption index published by Transparency 
International). Sweden is also one of the leading countries in e-government: the provision of 
services to individuals and businesses has reached 100 %23; the take-up of e-government 
services is also high (90 % for businesses and 68 % for citizens, which is the second highest in 
the EU); and the use of e-procurement is well advanced (56 % of municipalities, 50 % of 
county councils and 28 % of state authorities were using e-procurement at the end of 2010). 
At the same time, the Swedish authorities are aware that there is room for improvement in 
terms of cost-effectiveness, streamlining and simplification. Setting up a company is case in 
point as it remains burdensome, time-consuming and costly in Sweden. In fact, in terms of the 
number of days needed to set up a new company Sweden performs worse than most other 
member states. 
Sweden is currently developing a new strategy with a view to stepping up and extending e-
government, with targets to be reached by 2015 and a long-term vision for 2020. Moreover, 
the 2010 Bill on public administration for democracy, participation and growth proposes 
comprehensive use by government agencies of e-procurement by 2013, simplified contacts 
with public administration and possible outsourcing of certain public administration support 
functions in order to improve efficiency and reduce administrative costs. In the Bill, the 
government also proposes scaling back provision by public entities of goods and services on 
markets in order to keep market distortions to a minimum and grant private sector providers a 
level playing field. 
Although the administrative burden is not very high in Sweden compared to other EU 
countries24, the Swedish government is taking measures to make further reductions in the 
resources which Swedish businesses, in particular SMEs, need to allocate in order to comply 
with the rules and requirements. In 2006, the government set a target to reduce the 
administrative burden for businesses by 25 % by 2010 (subsequently postponed to 2012). As 
the reduction achieved so far is just over 7 %, the Swedish government has stepped up its 
efforts considerably this year by taking a large number of measures: a simplification 
programme for 2011-2014; a newly created ‘forum for better regulation’ consisting of 
representatives from the business community, local authorities, county councils, and 
                                                 
23 Based on a basket of eight basic services for enterprises and twelve basic services for citizens. 
24 European Commission, Member States Competitiveness Performance and Policies 2011. 
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government agencies and bodies; a new training programme for improving interaction 
between local authorities and enterprises; and several analyses to support and guide future 
policy measures. The mandate of the Swedish Better Regulation Council has been widened 
and extended until 2014. Furthermore, the Swedish government has decided to postpone the 
annual assessment of administrative costs until 2013 and in the meantime is looking for 
alternative, less burdensome ways of measuring administrative costs. In the area of taxation, 
several measures have been taken to simplify tax procedures for businesses and individuals 
(e.g. taxation of foreign experts). 
The measures to reduce the administrative burden are relevant and in line with the priorities of 
the 2012 AGS, although it is less certain whether they will ensure that the target is achieved in 
2012. 
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4. OVERVIEW TABLE 
2011 commitments Summary assessment 
Country-specific recommendations (CSRs) 
CSR 1: Keep fiscal policy on a path that ensures that 
the medium-term objective continues to be met. 
 
Sweden has implemented the recommendation only 
partially. 
The stance adopted in the Budget Bill for 2012 is 
considered balanced, reconciling fiscal prudence 
with a need to counter the economic slowdown. The 
medium-term objective  was not achieved in 2011, 
but is likely to be met in 2012-2013. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the government has lowered the 
MTO from +1% of GDP to -1% of GDP as of 2012. 
The Commission estimates the structural balance to 
have reached reach 0% of GDP in 2011 and to reach 
0.3% and 0.4% of GDP in 2012 and 2013, 
respectively. 
CSR 2: Take preventive action to deal with the 
macroeconomic risks associated with rising house 
prices and household indebtedness. A broad set of 
measures could be considered, such as reviews of the 
mortgage system, including the capital requirements 
of banks, rent regulation, property taxation and 
construction permits 
 
Sweden has implemented the recommendation only 
partially. 
Although the stabilisation of the housing and 
mortgage markets makes the implementation of the 
recommendation less urgent, it remains valid in the 
long term. The measures taken by the government 
are going in the right direction, but focus mainly on 
strengthening the resilience of the financial sector, 
where the level of ambition is high. Measures to 
foster prudent lending and diminish the debt bias in 
the financing of housing investment,  have so far 
received less attention. The government has taken 
some initial steps to ease the rent regulation and is 
considering measures to tackle the constraints in the 
housing supply. 
CSR 3: Monitor and improve the labour market 
participation of young people and other vulnerable 
groups. 
Sweden has implemented the recommendation only 
partially. 
The government has adopted a large number of 
measures which can be expected to have a positive 
impact. However, since most of the reforms are not 
being implemented until 2012, it is too early to 
assess whether they have actually had any 
significant effects on the target groups. A political 
debate has been launched on ways to increase the 
flexibility at the lower end of the wage scale and to 
ease the difference in employment protection 
legislation for temporary and permanent workers. 
Nevertheless, a more determined effort in these 
areas  would be warranted to address the challenge. . 
Europe 2020 (national targets and progress) 
Employment rate target set in the 2011 NRP: 
Well over 80 % 
Employment rate (%) 
2010: 78.7 %, 2011: 80% 
The EU-wide target has been met. Achievement of 
the more ambitious national target, already attained 
in 2007-2008, has been hindered by a significant 
increase in unemployment following the 2008-2009 
crisis. Since then, significant progress has been 
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made towards the achievement of the target. 
R&D target set in the 2011 NRP: 
Approximately 4 % GDP 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (in % of GDP) 
2009: 3.61 %, 2010: 3.42 % 
No progress has been made towards the achievement 
of the target. The increase in public R&D 
expenditure as a share of GDP was outweighed by a 
decrease in business R&D expenditure. 
Greenhouse gas emission target set in the 2011 NRP: 
a) -17 % compared with the 2005 level or 
b) -40 % compared with the 1990 level 
Greenhouse gas emissions: 
a) base year 2005: 2010: -10.2 % 
b) base year 1990: 2009: -17 % 
Progress has been made towards achievement of the 
target. Sweden is on track to meet the target by 
2020. 
Renewable energy target set in the 2011 NRP: 
49 % 
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy 
consumption: 
2009: 47.3 % (Eurostat), 2010: 47.8 % (national RES 
report) 
Progress has been made towards achievement of the 
target. Sweden is on track to meet the target by 
2020. The interim target for 2011/2012 was 
achieved already in 2009. 
Energy efficiency — reduction in primary energy 
consumption by 2020 (in Mtoe): 
12.8 Mtoe 
n.a. 
The method for assessing national progress in 
energy efficiency is currently being discussed by the 
institutions in the context of the proposed Energy 
Efficiency Directive. Alternative indicators (e.g. 
energy intensity) suggest that progress has been 
made towards achieving the target. 
Early school leaving target (in %): 
10 % 
Early leavers from education and training 
(percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at 
most lower secondary education and not in further 
education or training): 
2009: 10.7 %, 2010: 9.7 % 
The target has been achieved. 
Tertiary education target (in %): 
40-45 % 
 
Tertiary educational attainment 
2009: 43.9 %, 2010: 45.8 % 
The target has been achieved. It was even exceeded 
in 2010. 
Target on the reduction of population at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion in number of persons: 
Reducing the number of people aged 20-64 who are 
not in the labour force (except full-time students), the 
long-term unemployed or those on long-term sick 
leave to well under 14 %. 
According to the NRP, the share of the population 
defined in the target is estimated to be about 13 % of 
the age group in 2011 which is a reduction by one 
percentage point compared with 2010. 
Progress was made towards meeting the target 
between 2010 and 2011, according to preliminary 
figures. 
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5. ANNEX 
Table I. Macroeconomic indicators 
1995-
1999
2000-
2004
2005-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Core indicators
GDP growth rate 3.4 3.0 2.5 -5.0 6.1 3.9 0.3 2.1
Output gap 1 -1.5 0.3 2.0 -5.6 -1.4 0.4 -1.0 -0.6
HICP (annual % change) 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.5
Domestic demand (annual % change) 2 2.6 2.0 2.9 -4.6 6.2 3.4 0.6 1.8
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 3 8.6 6.3 6.8 8.3 8.4 7.5 7.7 7.7
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 16.4 17.4 19.1 18.0 18.1 18.3 18.5 18.6
Gross national saving (% of GDP) 21.3 23.3 27.3 23.3 25.4 26.7 25.1 25.3
General government (%  of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -2.1 0.7 2.6 -0.7 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.1
Gross debt 70.3 52.6 43.7 42.6 39.4 38.4 35.6 34.2
Net financial assets -22.2 -0.8 16.0 22.4 24.0 21.1 n.a n.a
Total revenue 59.0 55.6 54.8 54.0 52.4 51.4 51.8 51.8
Total expenditure 61.1 54.9 52.2 54.7 52.2 51.1 52.1 51.8
  of which: Interest 4.9 2.5 1.7 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1
Corporations (%  of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) 4.4 2.9 3.7 2.8 3.7 3.3 1.9 1.6
Net financial assets, non-financial corporations -109.3 -110.9 -141.7 -159.7 -167.7 -147.1 n.a n.a
Net financial assets, financial corporations 12.9 0.7 5.5 13.9 13.5 14.4 n.a n.a
Gross capital formation 12.0 12.3 13.0 10.0 12.0 13.0 12.8 12.9
Gross operating surplus 23.1 20.6 22.2 19.5 22.3 22.5 21.1 20.8
Households and NPISH (%  of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) 1.4 1.8 1.4 4.9 2.9 3.5 4.2 4.3
Net financial assets 84.9 91.3 102.7 110.1 115.0 101.2 n.a n.a
Gross wages and salaries 39.9 40.8 39.8 42.0 40.4 40.7 41.4 41.5
Net property income 3.2 2.5 2.8 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.0 3.1
Current transfers received 25.5 23.8 22.2 23.1 21.7 20.8 21.1 20.9
Gross saving 3.3 4.4 4.8 8.0 6.2 6.8 7.3 7.5
Rest of the world (%  of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) 3.8 5.6 7.9 6.7 6.6 7.1 5.7 5.8
Net financial assets 34.6 20.5 18.4 15.1 17.1 12.3 n.a n.a
Net exports of goods and services 6.8 7.0 7.5 6.5 6.3 6.2 5.6 5.8
Net primary income from the rest of the world -1.8 -0.1 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.8 1.8
Net capital transactions -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Tradable sector 42.7 42.0 41.4 38.8 40.2 40.2 n.a n.a
Non-tradable sector 44.7 45.7 46.2 48.5 47.1 47.6 n.a n.a
  of which: Building and construction sector 3.8 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.8 5.2 n.a n.a
Real effective exchange rate (index, 2000=100) 102.4 97.8 96.2 87.4 92.7 96.0 96.9 97.0
Terms of trade in goods and services (index, 2000=100) 104.4 97.7 94.5 95.3 95.1 94.4 93.8 93.6
Market performance of exports (index, 2000=100) 97.9 99.7 100.8 99.5 101.2 103.8 102.8 104.0
Commission spring 2012 forecast
Notes:
1 The output gap constitutes the gap between actual and potential gross domestic product at 2000 market prices.
2 The indicator for domestic demand includes stocks.
3  Unemployed persons are all persons who were not employed, had actively sought work and were ready to begin working immediately or within two 
weeks. The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. The unemployment rate covers the
Source :
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Table II. Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts 
2014 2015
COM CP COM CP COM CP CP CP
Real GDP (% change) 3.9 3.9 0.3 0.4 2.1 3.3 3.7 3.6
Private consumption (% change) 2.1 2.1 1.1 1.5 1.8 3.6 3.7 3.4
Gross fixed capital formation (% change) 5.8 5.8 1.1 1.4 3.3 5.3 8.1 7.9
Exports of goods and services (% change) 6.8 6.8 1.3 0.3 5.4 6.3 7.2 6.9
Imports of goods and services (% change) 6.1 6.1 2.2 0.4 5.2 6.1 7.5 7.2
Contributions to real GDP growth:
- Final domestic demand 2.6 2.6 1.0 1.1 1.7 2.8 3.4 3.2
- Change in inventories 0.7 0.7 -0.4 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- Net exports 0.7 0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3
Output gap1 0.4 0.9 -1.0 -1.9 -0.6 -1.8 -1.2 -0.7
Employment (% change) 2.2 2.1 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.3 1.4 1.7
Unemployment rate (%) 7.5 7.5 7.7 7.8 7.7 7.7 6.9 5.7
Labour productivity (% change) 1.7 2.2 0.1 0.4 1.7 3.0 2.4 1.9
HICP inflation (%) 1.4 1.4 1.1 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.4
GDP deflator (% change) 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.5
Comp. of employees (per head, % change) 0.8 1.1 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.5
Net lending/borrowing vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world (% of GDP)
7.1 8.4 5.7 6.3 5.8 6.4 6.3 6.2
Note:
Commission spring 2012 forecast (COM); Convergence programme (CP).
2011 2012 2013
1In percent of potential GDP, with potential GDP growth according to the programme as recalculated by the Commission.
Source :
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Table III. Composition of the budgetary adjustment 
2011 2014 2015 Change: 
2011-2015
COM COM CP COM CP CP CP CP
Revenue 51.4 51.8 51.7 51.8 51.2 50.8 50.8 -0.6
of which:
- Taxes on production and imports 18.4 18.6 18.7 18.6 18.6 18.4 18.3 -0.1
- Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 18.7 18.7 18.9 18.8 18.8 18.9 19.1 0.4
- Social contributions 7.6 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.5 7.5 7.5 -0.1
- Other (residual) 6.7 6.8 6.5 6.7 6.3 6.0 5.9 -0.8
Expenditure 51.1 52.1 51.7 51.8 50.7 49.1 47.8 -3.3
of which:
- Primary expenditure 50.1 51.1 50.7 50.7 49.7 48.1 47.0 -3.1
of which:
Compensation of employees 14.0 14.3 14.1 14.3 13.8 13.5 13.3 -0.7
Intermediate consumption 9.2 9.1 9.2 8.7 9.0 8.7 8.4 -0.8
Social payments 17.7 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.0 17.4 16.9 -0.8
Subsidies 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 -0.2
Gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.1 -0.3
Other (residual) 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.2 4.1 3.9 -0.4
- Interest expenditure 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 -0.2
General government balance (GGB) 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.5 1.7 3.0 2.7
Primary balance 1.3 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.5 2.6 3.8 2.5
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GGB excl. one-offs 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.5 1.7 3.0 2.7
Output gap2 0.4 -1.0 -1.9 -0.6 -1.8 -1.2 -0.7 -1.2
Cyclically adjusted balance2 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.4 1.6 2.4 3.4 3.4
Structural balance3 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.4 1.6 2.4 3.4 3.4
Change in structural balance 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.0
Structural primary balance3 1.1 1.4 2.0 1.5 2.6 3.4 4.2 3.2
Change in structural primary balance 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.8
Expenditure benchmark
Public expenditure growth4 (real) 2.25 2.02 1.51 1.51 0.35 0.84 -
Reference rate5,6 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 -
Lower reference rate5,7 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 -
Deviation in % of GDP 
   from applicable reference rate
0.20 0.09 -0.16 -0.16 -0.71 -0.46 -
Two-year average deviation in % of GDP 
   from applicable reference rate
n.a. n.a. 0.02 -0.03 -0.44 -0.59 -
7The lower reference rate applies as long as the country is adjusting towards its MTO, including the year in which it reaches the MTO.
5The reference rates applicable to 2014 onwards will be available from mid-2012. For illustrative purposes, the current reference rates have 
also been applied to the years 2014 onwards.
2Output gap (in % of potential GDP) and cyclically-adjusted balance according to the programme as recalculated by the Commission on the 
basis of the information in the programme.
3Structural (primary) balance = cyclically-adjusted (primary) balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
4Modified expenditure aggregate used for the expenditure benchmark, growth rates net of non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefit 
and of discretionary measures.
Source :
Convergence programme (CP); Commission spring 2012 forecast (COM); Commission calculations.
Notes:
1On a no-policy-change basis.
6The (standard) reference rate applies starting in the year following the one in which the country reaches its MTO.
2013
(% of GDP)
2012
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Table IV. Debt dynamics 
2014 2015
COM CP COM CP CP CP
Gross debt ratio1 41.3 38.4 35.6 37.7 34.2 35.4 31.8 27.5
Change in the ratio -2.2 -1.1 -2.7 -0.7 -1.5 -2.3 -3.6 -4.3
Contributions 2 :
1. Primary balance -2.9 -1.3 -0.8 -0.9 -1.2 -1.5 -2.6 -3.8
2. ‘Snow-ball’ effect -0.3 -0.8 0.6 0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8
Of which:
Interest expenditure 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
Growth effect -0.7 -1.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -1.2 -1.2 -1.1
Inflation effect -0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
3. Stock-flow adjustment 1.0 1.1 -2.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.3
Of which:
Cash/accruals diff. -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Accum. financial assets
Privatisation -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.4
Val. & residual effects 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
2014 2015
COM/CP3 CP4 COM/CP3 CP4 CP4 CP4
Gap to the debt benchmark5,6 - - - - - - - -
Structural adjustment7 - - - - - - - -
To be compared to:
Required adjustment8 - - - - - - - -
2012 2013Average 
2006-10
Source :
Convergence programme (CP); Commission spring 2012 forecast (COM); Commission calculations.
2011
2The snow-ball effect captures the impact of interest expenditure on accumulated debt, as well as the impact of real GDP growth and 
inflation on the debt ratio (through the denominator). The stock-flow adjustment includes differences in cash and accrual accounting, the 
accumulation of financial assets and valuation and other residual effects
(% of GDP)
8 Remaining annual structural adjustment assuming that the COM (CP) budgetary projections are achieved.
5 Not relevant during the excessive deficit procedures that were ongoing in November 2011 and in the three years following the correction 
of the excessive deficit.
6 If positive, the projected gross debt ratio does not comply with the debt reduction benchmark.
7Applicable only during the transition period of three years from the correction of the excessive deficit for excessive deficit procedures 
that were ongoing in November 2011.
2011
2012 2013
(% of GDP) average 
2006-10
3 Assessment of the consolidation path set in the CP assuming growth follows the COM forecasts
4 Assessment of the consolidation path set in the CP assuming growth follows the CP projections
1End of period.
Notes:
 
 29 
Table V. Long-term sustainability indicators 
no-policy 
change 
scenario 
CPs scenario
no-policy 
change 
scenario 
SCPs scenario
S2 1.8 0.6 2.9 0.7
of which:
Initial budgetary position (IBP) -1.1 -3.9 0.7 -1.6
Long-term change in the primary balance (LTC) 2.9 4.4 2.3 2.4
 of which:
pensions 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.2
care (health care and long-term) 2.4 3.7 1.5 1.5
other 0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.3
S1 (required adjustment)* -2.9 -7.2 2.2 -0.1
Debt,  % of GDP (2011)
Age-related expenditure, % of GDP (2011)
Source:  Commission, 2012 stability and convergence programmes. 
Note:  The ‘no-policy change’ scenario depicts the sustainability gap under the assumption that the 
 budgetary position evolves according to the spring 2011 forecast until 2013. The ‘convergence programme’ 
scenario depicts the sustainability gap under the assumption that the budgetary plans in the programme
are fully implemented.    
*  The required adjustment of the primary balance until 2020 to reach a public debt of 60% of GDP by 2030.
27.6 25.8
SE EU27
38.4 82.8
 
Figure I. Medium-term debt projections 
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Table VI. Taxation indicators 
2001 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total tax revenues (incl. actual compulsory social contributions, % of GDP) 49.4 48.9 47.3 46.4 46.7 45.8
Breakdown by economic function (% of GDP)1
     Consumption 12.5 12.7 12.4 12.7 13.3 13.3
              of which:
              - VAT 8.7 9.0 9.0 9.3 9.7 9.8
             - excise duties on tobacco and alcohol 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
             - energy 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2
             - other (residual) 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
     Labour employed 26.9 24.8 23.4 24.0 23.5 22.4
     Labour non-employed 3.9 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.5
     Capital and business income 4.3 5.5 6.2 4.7 4.6 5.3
     Stocks of capital/wealth 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4
     p.m.  Environmental taxes2 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8
VAT efficiency3
     Actual VAT revenues as % of theoretical revenues at standard rate 52.5 54.9 57.2 58.3 57.5 59.4
Source: Commission
3 The VAT efficiency is measured via the VAT revenue ratio. The VAT revenue ratio is defined as the ratio between the actual VAT revenue collected and the revenue that would theoretically be 
raised if VAT was applied at the standard rate to all final consumption. A low ratio can indicate a reduction of the tax base due to large exemptions or the application of reduced rates to a wide range 
of goods and services ('policy gap') or a failure to collect all tax due to e.g. fraud ('collection gap'). See European Commission (2011), Tax reforms in EU Member States, European Economy 5/2011, 
for a more detailed explanation.
1 Tax revenues are broken down by economic function, i.e. according to whether taxes are raised on consumption, labour or capital. See European Commission (2012), Taxation trends in the 
European Union, for a more detailed explanation.
2 This category comprises taxes on energy, transport and pollution and resources included in taxes on consumption and capital.
Note: 
 
 
Table VII. Financial market indicators 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total assets of the banking sector (% of GDP) 253.0 272.3 321.4 308.2 295.3
Share of assets of the five largest banks (% of total assets) 61.0 61.9 60.7 57.8 …
Foreign ownership of banking system (% of total assets) 10.0 10.6 6.8 … …
Financial soundness indicators:
              - non-performing loans (% of total loans) 0.6 1.0 2.0 ... ...
              - capital adequacy ratio (%) 1) 9.8 10.3 12.7 ... ...
              - return on equity (%) 1), 3) 19.7 14.3 5.1 10.5 11.9
Bank loans to the private sector (year-on-year % change) 9.5 -5.9 8.9 21.9 6.1
Lending for house purchase (year-on-year % change) 6.4 -4.0 18.1 47.5 6.0
Loan to deposit ratio 228.3 223.4 222.1 217.6 215.6
CB liquidity as % of liabilities 0.1 4.9 4.0 0.0 0.0
Banks' exposure to countries receiving official financial assistance  (% of GDP)4) 5.3 6.9 6.0 4.5 3.5
Private debt (% of GDP) 122.0 116.5 144.3 146.4 …
Gross external debt (% of GDP) 5)
            - Public … 12.9 16.0 17.8 15.6
            - Private … 62.5 78.2 70.4 66.1
Long term interest rates spread versus Bund (basis points)* -4.9 -9.6 2.8 15.0 -0.3
Credit default swap spreads for sovereign securities (5-year)* … 53.1 71.8 37.8 42.4
5) Latest data 2011Q3.
* Measured in basis points.
1) Four large banking groups.  Latest December 2009.
Notes: 
2) The capital adequacy ratio is defined as total capital divided by risk weighted assets.   
Bank for International Settlements and Eurostat (exposure to macro-financially vulnerable countries), IMF (financial soundness indicators), 
Commission (long-term interest rates), World Bank (gross external debt), ECB (all other indicators).
4) Covered countries are IE, EL, PT, RO, LV and HU.
3) Net income to equity ratio. Four large banking groups.  Latest March 2011.
Source :
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Table VIII.   Labour market and social indicators 
Labour market indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Employment rate 
(% of population aged 20-64) 78.8 80.1 80.4 78.3 78.7 80.0
Employment growth 
(% change from previous year) 1.9 2.5 1.2 -2.0 1.0 2.1
Employment rate of women 
(% of female population aged 20-64) 75.8 77.1 77.2 75.7 75.7 77.2
Employment rate of men 
(% of male population aged 20-64) 81.7 83.1 83.5 80.9 81.7 82.8
Employment rate of older workers 
(% of population aged 55-64) 69.6 70.0 70.1 70.0 70.5 72.3
Part-time employment 
(% of total employment) 24.8 24.8 27.2 27.7 27.1 26.6
Part-time employment of women  
(% of women employment) 39.2 39.0 42.1 41.9 41.0 40.2
Part-time employment of men  
(% of men employment) 11.8 11.9 13.7 14.6 14.4 14.2
Fixed term employment 
(% of employees with a fixed term contract) 17.3 17.5 16.1 15.3 15.8 16.4
Unemployment rate1 (% of labour force) 7.1 6.1 6.2 8.3 8.4 7.5
Long-term unemployment2  (% of labour force) 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.4
Youth unemployment rate 
(% of youth labour force aged 15-24) 21.5 19.2 20.2 25.0 25.2 22.9
Youth NEET3 rate (% of population aged 15-24) 9.3 7.5 7.8 9.6 7.8 :
Early leavers from education and training (% of 
pop. 18-24 with at most lower sec. educ. and not in 
further education or training)
13.0 12.2 12.2 10.7 9.7 :
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population 
30-34 having successfully completed tertiary 
education)
39.2 39.9 40.8 42.4 42.3 :
Labour productivity per person employed (annual 
% change ) 2.6 1.0 -1.5 -2.7 5.0 1.7
Hours worked per person employed  (annual % 
change) -0.4 0.8 0.3 -0.5 2.1 0.1
Labour productivity per hour worked (annual % 
change; constant prices) 2.9 0.2 -1.8 -2.2 2.8 1.6
Compensation per employee (annual % change; 
constant prices) 0.1 2.4 -1.6 -0.4 1.9 -0.2
Nominal unit labour cost growth (annual % 
change) -0.5 4.2 3.1 4.4 -1.9 -0.9
Real unit labour cost growth (annual % change) -2.4 1.4 -0.1 2.3 -2.9 -1.8
2 Share of persons in the labour force who have been unemployed for at least 12 months.
3 NEET are persons that are neither in employment nor in any education or training.
Sources: 
Commission (EU Labour Force Survey and European National Accounts) 
1 According to ILO definition, age group 15-74)
Notes:
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Expenditure on social protection 
benefits (% of GDP)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sickness/Health care 7.92 7.79 7.51 7.55 8.01
Invalidity 4.58 4.53 4.42 4.30 4.55
Old age and survivors 11.54 11.14 11.06 11.56 12.69
Family/Children 2.88 2.98 2.93 3.02 3.22
Unemployment 1.85 1.63 1.08 0.87 1.30
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.53 0.51 0.47 0.46 0.48
Total 31.1 30.4 29.2 29.5 32.1
of which:  Means tested benefits 0.88 0.84 0.78 0.78 0.86
Social inclusion indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Risk-of-poverty or exclusion1 (% of total 
population)
16.3 13.9 14.9 15.9 15.0
Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of 
people aged 0-17)
18.5 14.9 14.6 15.1 14.5
Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of 
people aged 65+)
11.9 10.4 15.5 18.0 15.9
At-risk-of-poverty rate2 (% of total population) 12.3 10.5 12.2 13.3 12.9
Value of relative poverty threshold (single 
household per year) - in PPS
9068 9545 10680 11258 10897
Severe material deprivation3  (% of total 
population)
2.1 2.2 1.4 1.6 1.3
Share of people living in low work intensity 
households4 (% of people aged 0-59 not 
student)
6.6 5.9 5.4 6.2 5.9
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons 
employed) 7.4 6.5 6.8 6.9 6.5
Sources: 
For expenditure on social protection benefits ESSPROS; for social inclusion EU-SILC.
Notes:
1 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE): individuals who are at risk of poverty (AROP) 
and/or suffering from severe material deprivation (SMD) and/or living in households with zero or very low 
work intensity (LWI).
2 At-risk-of poverty rate: share of people with an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the national 
equivalised median income. 
3 Share of people who experience at least 4 out of 9 deprivations: people cannot afford to i) pay their rent or 
utility bills, ii) keep their home adequately warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, fish, or a protein 
equivalent every second day, v) enjoy a week of holiday away from home once a year, vi) have a car, vii) have 
a washing machine, viii) have a colour TV, or ix) have a telephone.
4 People living in households with very low work intensity: share of people aged 0-59 living in households 
where the adults work less than 20% of their total work-time potential during the previous 12 months.
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Table IX. Product market performance and policy indicators 
Performance indicators 2002-2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Labour productivity1 total economy (annual growth in 
%)
3.2 1.0 -1.5 -3.2 4.5 2.2
Labour productivity1 in manufacturing (annual 
growth in %)
9.4 1.2 -5.4 -9.0 16.9 n.a.
Labour productivity1 in electricity, gas, water (annual 
growth in %)
-4.2 8.3 -6.7 -5.3 n.a. n.a.
Labour productivity1 in the construction sector 
(annual growth in %)
0.2 -1.5 -12.3 -4.4 3.5 n.a.
Patent intensity in manufacturing2 (patents of the 
EPO divided by gross value added of the sector)
4.2 4.3 3.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Policy indicators 2002-2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Enforcing contracts3 (days) n.a. 508 508 508 508 508
Time to start a business3 (days) n.a. 15 15 15 15 15
R&D expenditure (% of GDP) 3.7 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.4 n.a.
Tertiary educational attainment 
(% of 30-34 years old population) 34.1 41.0 42.0 43.9 45.8 n.a.
Total public expenditure on education 
(% of GDP) 7.1 6.7 6.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011
Product market regulation4, Overall
(Index; 0=not regulated; 6=most regulated)
n.a. n.a. 1.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Product market regulation4, Retail
(Index; 0=not regulated; 6=most regulated)
n.a. n.a. 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Product market regulation4, Network Industries5
(Index; 0=not regulated; 6=most regulated)
1.8 1.8 1.7* n.a. n.a. n.a.
4 The methodologies for the product market regulation indicators are presented in detail on the website 
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3746,en_2649_34323_2367297_1_1_1_1,00.html. The latest available product market 
regulation indicators refer to 2003 and 2008, except for Network Industries.
Source :
Commission, World Bank - Doing Business  (for enforcing contracts and time to start a business) and OECD (for the product 
market regulation indicators). 
5 Aggregate ETCR.
*figure for 2007.
Notes:
1Labour productivity is defined as gross value added (in constant prices) divided by the number of persons employed.
2 Patent data refer to applications to the European Patent Office (EPO). They are counted according to the year in which they were 
filed at the EPO. They are broken down according to the inventor's place of residence, using fractional counting if multiple 
inventors or IPC classes are provided to avoid double counting. 
3 The methodologies, including the assumptions, for this indicator are presented in detail on the website 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology. 
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Table X. Indicators on green growth 
2001-
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Energy intensity kgoe / € 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16
Carbon intensity kg / € 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 n.a.
Resource intensity (reciprocal of resource productivity) kg / € 0.64 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.59 n.a.
Waste intensity kg / € n.a. 0.30 0.27 0.26 n.a. n.a.
Energy balance of trade % GDP -1.4% -1.8% -1.7% -2.0% -1.3% -1.7%
Energy weight in HICP % 12 13 12 11 11 11
Difference between change energy price and inflation % 5.72 8.6 -2.2 6.5 -0.4 2
Environmental taxes over labour taxes ratio 9.5% 9.6% 9.6% 9.7% 10.3% n.a.
Environmental taxes over total taxes ratio 5.8% 5.6% 5.5% 5.8% 6.0% n.a.
Industry energy intensity kgoe / € 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.23 n.a.
Share of energy-intensive industries in the economy % GDP 11.8 11.5 11.4 11.6 10.7 n.a.
Electricity prices for medium-sized industrial users € / kWh 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08
Public R&D for energy % GDP n.a. 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% n.a.
Public R&D for the environment % GDP n.a. 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% n.a.
Recycling rate of municipal waste ratio 86.4% 96.1% 94.9% 96.1% 97.6% n.a.
Share of GHG emissions covered by ETS % n.a. 29.6% 28.9% 31.6% 29.1% n.a.
Transport energy intensity kgoe / € 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.46 n.a.
Transport carbon intensity kg / € 1.10 1.03 0.99 0.96 1.10 n.a.
Change in the ratio of passenger transport and GDP % -1.4% -3.9% 0.3% -0.2% n.a. n.a.
Energy import dependency % 38.6% 37.8% 36.3% 37.9% 37.4% n.a.
Diversification of oil import sources HHI n.a. 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.26 n.a.
Diversification of energy mix HHI 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.28 n.a.
Share of renewable energy in energy mix % 26.3% 28.5% 30.4% 31.3% 34.4% n.a.
Share of renewable energy in energy mix: percentage-share in  gross inland energy consumption, expressed in tonne oil equivalents
Transport energy intensity: final energy consumption of transport (in kgoe) divided by gross value added of industry (in EUR) 
Transport carbon intensity:  greenhouse gas emissions in transport divided by gross value added of the transport sector
Passenger transport growth : measured in %-change in passenger kilometres
Energy import dependency: net energy imports divided by gross inland energy consumption incl. of international bunkers
Diversification of oil import sources: Herfindahl index (HHI), calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of countries of origin 
Diversification of the energy mix: Herfindahl Index over natural gas, total petrol products, nuclear heat, renewable energies and solid fuels
Environmental taxes over labour or total taxes: from DG TAXUD's database "Taxation trends in the European Union"
Industry energy intensity: final energy consumption of industry (in kgoe) divided by gross value added of industry (in EUR) 
Share of energy-intensive industries in the economy: share of gross value added of the energy-intensive industries in GDP
Recycling rate of municipal waste: ratio of municipal waste recycled over total municipal waste
General explanation of the table items:
Source: Eurostat unless indicated otherwise; ECFIN explanations given below
Public R&D for energy or for the environment: government spending on R&D (GBAORD) for these categories as % of GDP
Share of GHG emissions covered by ETS: based on greenhouse gas emissions as reported by Member States to EEA (excl LULUCF)
          Carbon intensity: Greenhouse gas emissions (in kg CO2 equivalents) divided by GDP (in EUR)
          Resource intensity: Domestic Material Consumption (in kg) divided by GDP (in EUR)
          Waste intensity: waste (in kg) divided by GDP (in EUR)
Energy balance of trade: the balance of energy exports and imports, expressed as % of GDP  
Energy weight in HICP: the share of the "energy" items in the consumption basket used in the construction of the HICP
Difference between energy price change and inflation: energy component of HICP, and total HICP inflation (annual %-change)
All macro intensity indicators are expressed as a ratio of a physical quantity to GDP (in 2000 prices)
          Energy intensity: gross inland energy consumption (in kgoe) divided by GDP (in EUR)
Green Growth performance
Macroeconomic
Sectoral 
Security of energy supply
Country-specific notes: 
The year 2011 is not included in the table due to lack of data.
 
  
